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INTRODUCTION
As a career military attorney, at first blush, I probably seem 
like an unlikely candidate for inclusion in a symposium on 
“Persuasion in Civil Rights Advocacy.” And indeed, the focus of my 
professional work, like many Judge Advocate Generals’ (JAGs), has 
been on military justice, not civil rights. But it turns out that JAGs 
have been at the forefront of one of the most important civil and 
human rights struggles of our generation; namely, the fight to extend 
the rule of law and basic human and civil rights to the detainees of 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Some of these battles have played out in the 
courtrooms of the military commissions; while others have been 
fought in the federal courts, including the United States Supreme 
Court. In 2008-2009, I was right in the thick of this battle when I was 
assigned to represent two detainees before the military commissions 
of Guantanamo. In this Article, I will discuss some of the lessons I 
learned about civil rights advocacy—and advocacy more generally—
from this experience. 
Before I delve into my military commission experience, let me 
give you a little bit of my personal background, which may provide 
some perspective to my comments. Although I chose to pursue a 
career in the military, I do have civil rights in my blood. On my 
mother’s side of the family, my great, great Aunt was Jeannette 
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Rankin—the first woman elected to Congress, and a renowned 
pacifist, suffragette, and early leader in the women’s rights 
movement.1 More recently, my father was a civil rights lawyer in the 
1960s before becoming a law professor and law school 
administrator; while my mother, a parks and recreation professional, 
worked with underprivileged youths in city parks and summer camp 
programs before herself turning to a career in academia. Both my 
parents instilled in me a strong belief in the vital importance of civil 
and human rights, and of standing up against injustice and inequity. 
Some of my heroes growing up were Justice Robert Jackson, Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, and Justice William Brennan, whom I had the 
privilege to meet when I was a teenager. While in law school, I 
actively explored the possibility of becoming a civil rights attorney.
This exploration included spending a summer on the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Indian Reservation in South Dakota working for the Tribal 
Attorney General’s Office, where I helped with federal civil rights 
litigation on behalf of the Sioux Nation. But in the end, influenced in 
no small part by the movie “A Few Good Men,” which came out 
while I was in law school, I chose a different path, accepting a 
commission in the Air Force JAG Corps. Although I chose the Air 
Force in part because of the wide variety of practice areas in which 
JAGs are involved, I never expected that one of those practice areas 
would be civil and human rights. But when the opportunity came, I 
embraced it.  
After clerking for a wonderful federal judge, the Honorable 
Monroe G. McKay, Chief Judge emeritus of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, I entered active duty with the Air 
Force in September 1995. I served as a military prosecutor and 
military public defender, and I provided legal services to service 
members and their families, and legal advice to the Air Force on a 
wide variety of issues. After nearly a decade on active duty, in 2005, 
I transitioned into the Air Force Reserves and attempted to start a 
second career as a law professor. I decided to leave active duty in no 
small part because of my deep dissatisfaction over America’s
conduct of the war on terror, particularly our treatment of detainees. I
was deeply troubled by the Administration’s decision to disregard 
the advice of the JAG Corps to follow the Geneva Conventions and 
its seemingly complete abandonment of the rule of law with respect 
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to detainee treatment, particularly at Guantanamo.2 I was also very 
disturbed by the way that the military commissions had developed. 
When President Bush initially announced that those responsible for 
9/11 would be prosecuted in military tribunals, I was excited and 
volunteered to be a prosecutor. But when I saw the rules and 
procedures that were to be used, I was shocked by how incredibly 
unfair they were. The military commissions created by President 
Bush’s Executive Order had some of the features of a kangaroo court 
and bore no resemblance to the military justice system with which I 
was familiar. Thus, I was greatly heartened in the summer of 2006, 
when the Supreme Court invalidated the Executive Order creating 
the military commissions in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.3 The Military 
Commissions Act of 2006—the legislation authorizing the creation 
of military commissions passed in response to Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld—was a significant improvement over the Executive Order, 
but still fell well short, in my opinion, of international fair trial 
standards.4 So, in early 2008 when the Pentagon sent out a request 
for volunteers to serve as prosecutors and defense counsel in the 
commissions, I eagerly volunteered for the defense, hoping that 
through my advocacy, I could expose the shortcomings in this 
system and possibly help bring about reforms. I was ordered to 
report to the Office of Military Commissions, Office of the Chief 
Defense Counsel in late April 2008. 
MAY 2008 TO AUGUST 2009—REPRESENTING MOHAMMED JAWAD
Immediately upon my arrival I was detailed (assigned) as lead 
defense counsel to two detainees, Mohammed Jawad and Ali Hamza 
al Bahlul. I was told to get on the next plane to Guantanamo to 
prepare for the arraignments of both detainees, which were to take 
place the following week. Because Mr. al Bahlul, a loyal member of 
Al Qaida, refused to allow me to do any advocacy on his behalf 
(other than a failed effort to get the military commissions to 
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recognize his right to represent himself), this essay will focus on my 
efforts on behalf of Mohammed Jawad. 
Mohammed was captured in December 2002 in Kabul by 
Afghan security forces. He was suspected of throwing a hand 
grenade at two United States Special Forces soldiers and their 
interpreter, who were riding in a military jeep. All three passengers 
were injured when the grenade exploded, but all survived. After a 
few hours of interrogation by Afghan authorities, Mohammed was 
turned over to United States custody and initially taken to Bagram 
Prison; then, in February 2003, he was transferred to Guantanamo 
where he remained until his repatriation to Afghanistan on August 
24, 2009. Mohammed was the fourth person to be charged under the 
2006 Military Commissions Act. Charges were sworn on October 9, 
2007, and referred to trial by the Convening Authority on January 
30, 2008. I met him at Guantanamo on May 2, 2008. He was 
arraigned before the military commission on May 7, 2008, charged 
with three counts of “Attempted Murder in Violation of the Law of 
War” for allegedly throwing the hand grenade.5 I entered a plea of 
not guilty on his behalf. 
When we think about advocacy, we always need to consider 
our goal, our desired end state. The normal goal for a defendant and 
his or her counsel is to get an acquittal. If that is not possible, then 
the goal is to minimize the punishment, to get the lightest possible 
sentence. But the goal for Guantanamo detainees is slightly different. 
The goal is to get out of Guantanamo. And at Guantanamo, even an 
acquittal does not guarantee release. In fact, the Bush Administration 
made it clear that they reserved the right to continue to hold 
detainees as enemy combatants even in the event of an acquittal. So, 
I had to quickly adjust my strategy, stop thinking purely as a criminal 
defense counsel, and start considering alternate approaches and 
tactics to get Mohammed out of Guantanamo. And that brings me to 
my first lesson learned: 
Lesson 1:  There is more than one way to skin a cat, or 
“Think Outside Your Toolbox.”
One of my favorite sayings is “to the person who only has a 
hammer, every problem looks like a nail.” The Air Force, for 
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example, is very good at strategic and tactical use of aggressive air 
power, so we tend to see dropping bombs as the major part of the 
solution to most military problems. As lawyers, we tend to specialize 
in one kind of case or a particular subject matter or issue. Although 
specialization has its advantages, advocates with a narrow practice 
focus run the danger of becoming one tool wonders. The most 
effective advocates are versatile, flexible, and highly creative 
problem solvers. They have more than one tool in their toolbox, and 
they can even think outside their toolbox to come up with creative 
solutions to advance their client’s objectives. 
So what was Mohammed’s objective, his desired end state? 
Probably, like almost every other Guantanamo detainee, his desired 
end state was simply to go home (in his case, to Afghanistan). But he 
did not merely wish to be transferred to prison or continued detention 
in his home country, but rather hoped to be returned to his family, as 
a free man. Needless to say, this was easier said than done, for there 
were considerable obstacles standing in the way of this desired end 
state. Not only was Mohammed detained as an alleged alien unlawful 
enemy combatant at Guantanamo (for which he could ostensibly be 
held until “the end of hostilities”), but he was also facing three 
felony charges for which the maximum authorized sentence was 
confinement for life.  
With this in mind, one of my first steps was to consider the 
possible pathways out of Guantanamo.  
Pathway 1: Voluntary Release/Repatriation 
The United States government ultimately sends the vast 
majority of Guantanamo detainees home voluntarily. The detainee’s
home country could formally request or otherwise pressure the 
United States government to send home a particular detainee, or all 
of its nationals, which could hasten release. If the country was an 
ally, particularly a coalition partner in the war on terror, this was 
particularly effective. For example, several British detainees were 
sent home at the request of the United Kingdom government.  
But my client was from Afghanistan. And as of the summer of 
2008, Afghanistan had not asked for any of its detainees to be 
returned. But Afghanistan clearly was an ally in the war against Al 
Qaida and the Taliban, so it seemed worth an attempt to try to get the 
Afghan government to seek Mohammed’s release. Accordingly, I 
made an appointment to see the Afghan Ambassador to the United
States and tried to persuade him to do so. He said, in diplomatic 
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fashion, that he would take the matter under advisement and consult 
with his home government, but frankly, he did not seem very 
sympathetic. However, in the process of setting up the meeting, we 
met a young diplomat in the embassy who was very sympathetic to 
Mohammed and pledged to do what he could to help. And this turned 
out to be very valuable. He made introductions for us to other top 
officials in Afghanistan, which proved to be important when 
Mohammed was ultimately sent home.6
Our efforts to use diplomatic channels did not end with 
Afghanistan. We learned, through Omar Khadr’s7 defense team, that 
the European Union was deeply concerned about the presence of 
alleged child soldiers—detainees who were captured as juveniles, but 
who were detained under the same condition as adults in violation of 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,8 to which the 
United States was a party. So we met with representatives from the 
European Union at the French Embassy to enlist their support to 
bring pressure on the United States to release our client and other 
juveniles through diplomatic channels. 
Everyone whom we talked to agreed that in order to get 
Mohammed released, it would be helpful if the charges were 
dropped. So, how could that be accomplished? There were two 
persons with the clear authority to dismiss the charges: the Military 
Commissions Convening Authority and the Military Judge. 
The most obvious way to get the charges dropped would be 
through motions to dismiss, something that was more in the line of 
typical criminal defense work. I tried a number of different 
approaches to get the charges dismissed.9 First, I claimed there was a 
                                                
6. See Andy Worthington, The Military Lawyers Who Helped Free One of 
Guantanamo’s Youngest Detainees, PUBLIC RECORD (Sept. 21, 2009), http:// 
pubrecord.org/world/5377/guantanamos-youngest-detainees/.  
7. Omar Khadr was one of the first three detainees—and the only other 
person besides Mohammed also captured as a juvenile—to face charges in the 
military commissions. He ultimately pled guilty in 2010 in a deal that enabled him 
to return to his home country of Canada to serve the remainder of his sentence. 
Khadr was recently released on bail pending the outcome of an appeal of his 
conviction. See Spencer Ackerman, Canada Frees Omar Khadr, Once Guantánamo 
Bay’s Youngest Inmate, THE GUARDIAN (May 7, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2015/may/07/canada-free-bail-omar-khadr-guantanamo-bay-
youngest.  
8. G.A. Res. 54/263, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (Mar. 16, 2001).  
9. See David J. R. Frakt, Mohammed Jawad and the Military Commissions 
of Guantánamo, 60 DUKE L. J. 1367, 1372-73 (2011).  
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lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting that the Military Commissions
Act (MCA) did not authorize jurisdiction over juveniles. Second, I 
claimed a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the crime 
for which Mohammed was charged was not a war crime, and 
therefore it could not be tried in a law of war military commission. I
argued that throwing a hand grenade at uniformed military personnel 
in a military vehicle in a combat zone was not a war crime, but 
simply an ordinary part of fighting a war. The government’s
response was that any hostile act committed by an unlawful 
combatant, a civilian, was per se a war crime. The court rejected the
government’s theory and was on the verge of dismissing the charges, 
but the prosecution asked the court to delay, claiming that they had 
additional evidence of a law of war violation.10 The court agreed to 
give them an additional opportunity to present this information, but 
before they got around to doing so, the charges were dismissed for 
other reasons. I also claimed that the charges should be dismissed 
because of the government’s own violations of the law of war by 
subjecting Mohammed to cruel and inhumane treatment and torture, 
including sleep deprivation and beatings.11 In essence, I argued that 
the United States had forfeited the right to try Mohammed because of 
its own outrageous conduct. The government said the judge did not 
have the power to dismiss charges on this basis. The judge disagreed, 
concluding that dismissal was within his power. But although he 
found that Mohammed was tortured, he declined to dismiss the 
charges.12
My next strategy was to get so much of the evidence 
suppressed that the government could not prove the case and would 
voluntarily dismiss the charges. The primary pieces of evidence 
against Mohammed were two purported confessions, one made to the 
Afghan authorities and one to United States military interrogators. I
filed motions to suppress these statements on the basis that the 
                                                
10. For an extended discussion of this subject, see David J. R. Frakt, Direct 
Participation in Hostilities as a War Crime: America’s Failed Efforts to Change the 
Law of War, 46 VAL. U. L. Rev. 729, 745-47 (2012).  
11. See David J. R. Frakt, Closing Argument at Guantanamo: The Torture 
of Mohammed Jawad, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 18-19 (2009); see also David Frakt, 
Closing Argument at Guantanamo II: The Torture of Mohammed Jawad, Continued,
PEN AM., http://www.pen.org/nonfiction/closing-argument-guantanamo-ii-torture-
mohammad-jawad-continued (last visited Dec. 10, 2015). 
12. Ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss – Torture of the Detainee, United 
States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 334, D-008 (Military Comm’n Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
Sept. 24, 2008). 
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confessions were the product of torture.13 Both motions were 
granted.14 Realizing that they could not proceed without at least one 
of the confessions, the government filed an interlocutory appeal to 
the Court of Military Commission Review.15
I also attempted, through various ways, to convince the 
Convening Authority to drop the charges. The Convening Authority 
at the time was Susan Crawford, a protégé of Dick Cheney. In 
January 2009, she gave an interview with Bob Woodward of the 
Washington Post,16 in which she explained that she had dismissed the 
charges against Mohammed al Qatani, the alleged twentieth hijacker 
from 9/11 because he had been subjected to torture. Armed with the 
judge’s ruling that Mohammed had also been tortured, I started an 
intense lobbying campaign to get her to drop the charges, sending 
her a series of memos. I also set up an online petition through which 
I gathered signatures and comments urging her to withdraw the 
charges.17
Another way to get the charges dismissed would be through 
legislative action that would deprive the military commissions of 
jurisdiction. Along with a number of human rights groups, including 
the ACLU, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Human 
Rights First, and the Brennan Center for Justice, I lobbied 
sympathetic members of Congress, including Senator Dick Durbin, 
to amend the MCA to put in a minimum age requirement, to exclude 
minors from the reach of the MCA. Although such an amendment 
                                                
13. Defense Motion to Suppress Out-of-Court Statements by the Accused 
due to Coercive Interrogation, Jawad, 1 M.C. 345 (Military Comm’n Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba Sept. 18, 2008). 
14. Ruling on Defense Motion to Suppress Out-of-Court Statements of the 
Accused to Afghan Authorities, Jawad, 1 M.C. 345, D-022 (Military Comm’n
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Oct. 28, 2008); Ruling on Defense Motion to Suppress Out-
of-Court Statements by the Accused Made While in U.S. Custody, Jawad, 1 M.C. 
349, D-021 (Military Comm’n Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Nov. 19, 2008).
15. See Brief on Behalf of Appellant, United States v. Jawad, No. 08-004 
(Ct. Military Comm’n Rev. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Dec. 4, 2008). I argued this 
appeal on January 13, 2009, but the Court of Military Commission Review never 
issued a ruling, as the issue was subsequently mooted by external events. 
16. Bob Woodward, Guantanamo Detainee was Tortured, Says Official 
Overseeing Military Trials, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372.html. 
17. See David J. R. Frakt, Support Defense Request for Guantanamo 
Detainee Mohammad Jawad, CARE2 PETITIONS http://www.thepetitionsite.com/46/ 
support-the-defense-request-for-reconsideration-of-the-referral-of-charges-against-
guantanamo-detain/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2015). 
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was actually proposed in 2009 when the MCA was revised, it did not 
pass.18
Pathway 2: Plea Bargain  
A more realistic approach to getting out of Guantanamo for 
those facing charges before the military commissions is to try to 
work out a plea deal. The MCA gives the Convening Authority, the 
person overseeing the Commissions, the power to negotiate plea 
bargains.19 That power includes the power to make release or return 
to one’s country to complete a jail sentence a term of the agreement. 
In 2007, under pressure from the Australian government,20 the 
Convening Authority negotiated a plea bargain with Australian 
David Hicks by which he would plead guilty to one count of 
Material Support to Terrorism for joining the Taliban and would get 
a nine-month sentence, which he would be sent home to Australia to 
serve.21 (Hicks’s conviction was recently vacated on the basis that 
Material Support to Terrorism is not a war crime and therefore the 
military commissions had no subject matter jurisdiction over that 
offense.22) Several other detainees have subsequently negotiated plea 
bargains that included repatriation.23
                                                
18. See Frakt, supra note 9, at 1380 n.72.
19. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 705 
(2012). 
20. Geoff Elliott, Hicks Case ‘Pushed to Suit Howard’, THE AUSTRALIAN
(Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/hicks-case-pushed-to-
suit-howard/story-e6frg6nf-1111115636668; Tom Allard, Prisoner of Political 
Fortune Set Free, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Dec. 29, 2007), http://www.smh.com. 
au/news/national/prisoner-of-political-fortune-set-free/2007/12/28/1198778703367. 
html. 
21. Michael Melia, Australian Gitmo Detainee Gets 9 Months, WASH. POST
(Mar. 31, 2007, 5:06 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2007/03/31/AR2007033100279.html (describing plea deal and sentence of David 
Hicks). 
22. See Hicks v. United States, 94 F.Supp.3d 1241 (C.M.C.R. 2015); see
also Matt Apuzzo, Guantánamo Conviction of Australian is Overturned, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2015, at A15.  
23. Omar Khadr Leaves Guantánamo to Return to Canada, THE GUARDIAN
(Sept. 29, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/29/omar-
khadr-guantanamo-canada (describing plea bargain of Omar Khadr); Charlie 
Savage, Sudanese Detainee to be Sent Home from Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 
2013, at A21 (describing plea bargain of Noor Uthman Mohammed); Charlie 
Savage, Guantánamo Prisoner is Repatriated to Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, 
at A9 (describing plea deal of Ibrahim al-Qosi). 
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I thought if I could get an agreement similar to what David 
Hicks’s defense counsel had negotiated, that would be a positive 
result for my client. My first step was to try to convince the 
prosecutor that a plea bargain was in order. Accordingly, I started a 
personal campaign to convince my opposing counsel, Lieutenant 
Colonel (LTC) Darrel Vandeveld, that a plea was in the interests of 
justice. The terms that I suggested were time served, plus a six- to 
nine-month period of rehabilitation to prepare Mohammed for 
reintegration into society. I argued that providing a period of 
rehabilitation would be consistent with the requirements of the 
Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers, which the United States had 
blatantly disregarded. I noted that at that point, Mohammed had 
already been in United States custody for over five and one-half 
years without any contact from his family, and I reminded LTC
Vandeveld that he had been tortured and abused in United States 
custody. Hadn’t he been punished enough, I asked? LTC Vandeveld, 
a deeply ethical and principled officer, agreed. So LTC Vandeveld 
and I went together to talk to his boss, Chief Prosecutor Colonel 
Lawrence Morris, and try to sell him on the deal. He said he was not
opposed to a plea bargain, but he felt six to nine months was a little 
low. So I asked him what kind of deal he could support and he said, 
“twenty years, with no credit for time served.” Needless to say, this 
was not an acceptable offer. So the plea bargain route did not 
succeed. But my efforts to persuade LTC Vandeveld of the 
unfairness of prosecuting Mohammed did bear fruit. He became 
convinced that prosecuting Mohammed was unjust. In fact, he started 
to believe that Mohammed might actually be innocent. And he tried 
to get his superiors to drop the charges, but they refused. Convinced 
that he could not ethically prosecute Mohammed, he did the 
honorable thing and resigned.24 But he went beyond merely 
resigning, he became an outspoken critic of the military commissions 
and an effective advocate for Mohammed,25 providing sworn 
testimony before Congress26 and to the United States District Court27
that he believed Mohammed was innocent and should be sent home.  
                                                
24. William Glaberson, Guantánamo Prosecutor is Quitting in Dispute 
Over a Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at A20. 
25. Stacy Sullivan, Confessions of a Former Guant, SALON (Oct. 23, 
2008, 6:19 AM), http://www.salon.com/2008/10/23/vandeveld/. 
26. Legal Issues Surrounding the Military Commissions System: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Const., Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of the Comm. of 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 16-23 (2009) (statement of Lieutenant Colonel Darrel J. 
Vandeveld, Former Prosecutor, Guantanamo Bay Military Comm’ns).
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And that brings me to my next lesson learned: 
Lesson 2:  Opposing Counsel is not the Enemy. 
During my career, I have seen a troubling tendency of lawyers 
to view opposing counsel as the enemy and treat them accordingly, 
sometimes with outright hostility. While this may seem natural in an 
adversarial justice system, this tendency should be avoided. Rather, 
you should view your opposing counsel as a potential ally in your 
crusade for justice.  
Of all the people involved in your case, your opposing counsel 
has probably the greatest power of anyone to help you achieve the 
desired outcome. In a civil case, this could be through exerting 
influence on his or her client to agree to an equitable outcome, 
perhaps settling the case on favorable terms or voluntarily changing 
unlawful or questionable practices. In the criminal context, it could 
be through voluntarily dismissing charges or agreeing to a pretrial 
diversion or some other favorable disposition. So be civil, be 
courteous, and cultivate a cordial relationship with your opposing 
counsel. Ask them out to lunch or for a drink and get to know them a 
little. Do not assume just because they represent evil corporation X 
or evil government agency Y, that they themselves are evil, or even 
that they personally support whatever position their client has 
directed them to advocate. Chances are that they were once just as 
idealistic as you before they joined what you now consider to be “the 
dark side.” Assume that they are acting in good faith. While it may 
be unlikely that you will persuade your opposing counsel to publicly 
resign and renounce his former positions as LTC Vandeveld did, a 
positive relationship with opposing counsel can bear fruit in many 
more subtle ways.  
Pathway 3: Habeas Corpus  
Getting back to Mohammed Jawad—since the plea bargain 
route was foreclosed and voluntary release by the United States 
government seemed extremely unlikely, we needed to find another 
way to get him out of Guantanamo. The third route home from 
                                                                                                      
27. Exhibit B, Bacha v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 05–
2385 (ESH)), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/vandeveld_ 
declaration.pdf. 
1610 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1599 
Guantanamo is by a court order through a petition of habeas corpus. 
On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court, in Boumediene v. Bush, ruled 
that detainees had the right to file a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the 
lawfulness of their detention and seeking an order of release.28 The 
problem for Mohammed Jawad was the D.C. District Court had 
repeatedly ruled that if there were active military commission 
charges pending, a habeas corpus petition was not ripe, and the 
District Court would not hear it. Thus, at the time of the Supreme 
Court decision, Mohammed was not eligible for habeas corpus relief. 
However, in the fall of 2008, on the hope that newly elected 
President Obama would put an end to the military commissions (or at 
least drop the cases against Mohammed and Omar Khadr, the two 
juvenile defendants), I enlisted the aid of the ACLU National 
Security Project to assist me in filing a habeas corpus petition on 
Mohammed’s behalf.  
I am reasonably certain that this was the first time that a 
serving military officer has ever employed the ACLU to sue the 
United States to gain the release of a declared unlawful enemy 
combatant. But I did not know the first thing about habeas corpus,
and I had never practiced in federal district court. In contrast, the 
ACLU lawyers I had met, Hina Shamsi and Jonathan Hafetz, were 
subject matter experts with extensive federal court experience. 
Fortunately, they were willing to help.  
And that brings me to my next lesson learned: 
Lesson 3:  Know your own limitations as an advocate. 
 And do not be afraid to ask for help.  
Lawyers take great pride in their ability to master new areas of 
law through self-study. And lawyers are reluctant to relinquish or 
share control over litigation in which they are involved. But your 
duty is to your client, and you have to do what is in the client’s best 
interest. You may not have the time to become an expert in a new 
area of law during an ongoing case. You may not have the resources 
to pursue the best litigation strategy on your own. You have to be 
willing to put your ego to the side and reach out for assistance. Your 
client is counting on you. 
As we know, President Obama did not end the military 
commissions; but he did, on his first day in office, temporarily 
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suspend them. Thanks to the ACLU, we were poised to take 
advantage of this hiatus. Citing the suspension of military 
commission activities and the uncertain future of the commissions, 
we prevailed upon District Court Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle to take 
up the habeas corpus petition and order the government to respond to 
it on the merits.  
Our petition asserted there was no lawful basis to hold 
Mohammed. The Department of Justice (DOJ) was supposed to 
explain in their response why they believed they did have a lawful 
basis to hold him. One would have thought that, more than six years 
after detaining Mohammed, the government would readily be able to 
explain their basis for doing so. But the DOJ claimed that they could 
not. They requested an extension to respond to the petition, asserting 
that it would take several months to search all the databases and 
gather all the records from the various agencies that maintained 
information about the detainees.  
Judge Huvelle did not like DOJ’s answer. She said, in essence, 
“You’ve had him in custody for six and one-half years. And you 
can’t tell me why?” She gave the government a short deadline to 
respond to the petition. When they did, the principle evidence they 
cited in support of detention were the two purported confessions to 
throwing the hand grenade, the very same confessions that the judge 
in the military commissions had ordered suppressed as the product of 
torture. Judge Huvelle expressed incredulity that the government 
would rely on evidence that had previously been found inadmissible. 
When the DOJ attorney responded that military commission rulings 
were not binding on her, she announced that she would hold her own 
suppression hearing to determine their admissibility. Just before the 
suppression hearing, the DOJ changed course and informed the court 
they now agreed that the statements were the product of torture and 
were no longer relying on them. The government requested 
additional time to provide a revised response to the habeas petition. 
Judge Huvelle became so frustrated with the government’s dilatory 
tactics that, when they next appeared before her, she gave them a 
judicially rare excoriation.  
Unfortunately, there were no journalists present to witness 
Judge Huvelle’s scolding. But fortunately, there was a court 
stenographer recording it. So we paid a small fee to get an expedited 
transcript and immediately forwarded it to a friendly reporter at the 
New York Times. He wrote a story about it and managed to get it on
the front page. A few excerpts from the story provide a sense of the 
Judge’s displeasure and the general tenor of the article:
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Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle of Federal District Court . . . criticized the 
government’s case against the detainee as “an outrage” that was “riddled 
with holes.”  
. . . . 
Judge Huvelle expressed fury at the government for “dragging this out 
for no good reason” after “your case fell apart,” according to a transcript 
of the hearing.  
. . . . 
. . . Judge Huvelle has given the government until the end of the week to 
tell the court whether it would produce any witnesses and suggested that 
she might rule that Mr. Jawad should be returned to Afghanistan.  
“You’d better go consult real quick with the powers that be, because this 
is a case that’s been screaming at everybody for years,” Judge Huvelle 
said.29
And that brings me to my next lesson: 
Lesson 4:  Do not antagonize the judge, or “Hell hath no 
fury like a federal judge scorned.”
In addition to building a positive rapport with your opposing 
counsel, you should try very hard to maintain your judge’s respect 
and good will. While you should not invite your judge out for drinks, 
you can earn the judge’s willingness to positively consider your 
arguments by carefully proofreading your filings, submitting your 
filings in a timely manner, being courteous to clerks and court 
personnel, and otherwise studiously complying with the rules of 
court. Surprisingly, too many lawyers submit sloppily researched 
and poorly drafted materials that may earn a judge’s disdain. If you 
think you are going to need a continuance or extension, do not wait 
until the last minute to ask for it. Most critically, always be candid 
with the tribunal. Always cite adverse precedent up front and 
forthrightly acknowledge shortcomings or weaknesses in your case. 
If the judge considers you to be a decent, honest, ethical, and hard-
working attorney, there is a good chance she will give your client the 
benefit of the doubt when there is a close call or a discretionary 
judgment to be made in your case. On the other hand, if you submit 
poorly drafted or late filings, continuously seek extensions, 
constantly make excuses, fail to cite clearly adverse precedents, and 
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make frivolous arguments, you are likely to invoke the judge’s wrath, 
and your time before her will be uncomfortable for you and will 
negatively impact your client. 
Shortly after the New York Times story ran, “the powers that 
be” were consulted and the DOJ abruptly changed course; the 
government informed Judge Huvelle that they no longer considered 
Mohammed Jawad an enemy combatant and joined us in asking her 
to grant the petition for habeas corpus and order his release, a request 
that she was only too happy to oblige. On July 30, 2009, she ordered 
his release, giving the government three weeks to arrange 
Mohammed’s transfer in order to comply with a recently enacted 
provision requiring advance notice to Congress for the release of a 
detainee.30 I promptly forwarded the court order to the Convening 
Authority for the military commissions. I explained that because the 
U.S. government no longer considered Mohammed an enemy 
combatant, the military commissions no longer had jurisdiction over 
him, and therefore, the military commission charges had to be 
dismissed. Shortly thereafter, the Convening Authority grudgingly 
complied with my demand. Three weeks later, Mohammed Jawad 
went home to his family in Afghanistan a free man.  
And that brings me to my next lesson: 
Lesson 5:  Use the press to your advantage, or “There’s 
 nothing like a front page story in the New York 
 Times to get the attention of powerful people.” 
Although I believe I ultimately would have prevailed in earning 
Mohammed’s release, I am quite certain that our victory and his 
repatriation were significantly hastened by the New York Times
story. This demonstrates that the right kind of news coverage or 
publicity can create pressure on the opposing party to resolve a 
dispute on favorable terms to your client. To the extent permitted by 
the relevant rules of professional responsibility on pretrial publicity 
in your jurisdiction, you should consider whether press coverage 
would potentially be helpful to your case and how to utilize the 
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media to your advantage. Of course, there is always a risk that a 
journalist will not report the story in the way that you envision, so 
you must assess your ability to shape the coverage to create the 
desired result. In Mohammed’s case, as with all the military 
commissions, there was a considerable degree of media interest, and 
I had the opportunity to get to know several of the journalists who 
regularly covered the Guantanamo beat, so I had a good sense of 
how a particular journalist would likely report the information I 
provided to him or her.  
Of course, not every case is newsworthy and you cannot count 
on getting a story in the front page of the New York Times. But all 
media outlets are looking for “content,” so if there is anything 
interesting about your case at all, it is likely that you can use the 
press as part of your advocacy strategy. In my time at the 
commissions, I learned some valuable lessons about how to best 
utilize the media. 
If you think you have got a good story, there is a tendency to 
want to share it with everyone by issuing a press release and blasting 
it out to every news organization. Unless your story is truly 
sensational, that is a recipe for getting a one paragraph blurb buried 
in the back pages of the publication or on their website. If you give a 
journalist an exclusive, you stand a much better chance of getting a 
major story published; and if you choose the right reporter, you have 
a greater likelihood of ensuring that the tone of the story is to your 
liking. This was the strategy we employed to get the story in the New 
York Times. We sent the transcript to one reporter and offered him an 
exclusive if he promised to get the story published. I also used this 
strategy at other times to get well-placed stories in other major 
newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times31 and Washington 
Post.32 Although it is obviously preferable to get your story in a 
major news outlet, that is not critical. If it is a really good story, other 
news outlets will pick it up, and other journalists will end up calling 
you for follow-up stories.  
                                                
31. Josh Meyer, For Lawyer, Trial Was Tribulation, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 
2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/12/nation/na-gitmo12 (reporting on Lt. 
Col. Darrel Vandeveld’s resignation from the military commissions).
32. Josh White, Detainee’s Attorney Seeks Dismissal Over Abuse, WASH. 
POST (June 8, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/ 
06/07/AR2008060701904.html. 
Representing Guantanamo Detainees 1615
CONCLUSION
On the day that I arrived at the Office of Military 
Commissions, I was assigned an office. When I walked in, a senior 
officer was in the process of packing up some boxes. He said to me, 
“You must be my replacement. Let me give you some friendly 
advice. Don’t ever start thinking that you can win a case at 
Guantanamo. It doesn’t matter if the facts are on your side. The deck 
is so stacked against the detainees and the process is so slanted that 
you can’t possibly win. So do yourself a favor and don’t get your 
hopes up and, whatever you do, don’t give your client any hope that 
he might have a chance to go home because it is never going to 
happen.” I am happy to say that I did not follow this advice. I never 
gave up my belief that in the end, justice and the rule of law would 
prevail. I had faith that determined, zealous, and creative advocacy 
could make a difference for my client and that our system, however 
flawed, would ultimately deliver a fair outcome. And while I was 
candid with Mohammed about the obstacles in our path and did not 
sugarcoat his chances, I always tried to project optimism and 
encouraged him not to give up hope. It was very important for 
Mohammed that I believed in him and his case, and it boosted his 
spirits when he was in a very bleak situation. Fifteen months later, 
my faith in the system was vindicated. With the help of my military 
co-counsel, the ACLU, Lieutenant Colonel Darrel Vandeveld, and 
the New York Times, I did win a case at Guantanamo. And that 
brings me to my final lesson learned. 
Lesson 6:  Keep the Faith. Justice will prevail. 

